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Poole: Some Aspects of the Role of Government in Stable Growth

SOME ASPECTS OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
IN STABLE GROWTH*
KENYON

E. POOLE"=

The major purpose of this paper is to review some evidence on the proposition that substantial progress has been made in the quality and efficiency
of policies for stable growth since World War II. The experience referred
to will be that of a number of Organization for European Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries, with primary reference to major industrial
economies.
It is common for enthusiasts to speak of a "revolution" in the use of
government planning for stability and growth, and in a certain sense a
revolution has indeed occurred. Perhaps the outstanding example is France,
whose series of plans (the Fifth Plan runs from 1966 to 1970) has gained
respectful attention the world over for high and, more important, rising
standards of performance. But even with respect to countries that have not
officially adopted economic planning, anyone familiar with the first modest
steps taken at the close of the Second World War would be somewhat startled
at the amount of effort now devoted to achieving stable growth. We recall,
for example, that the 1944 British White Paper on Employment Policy
focused on full employment rather than growth, and that in the United States
the Murray Full Employment Bill of 1945 was trimmed to the more modest
Employment Act of 1946. At that time doubts still assailed many economists
and legislators on the advisability of plumping outright for the twin objectives
of economic stability and a target rate of growth. Moreover, the latter concept is hardly explicit in the Declaration of Policy of the Employment Act,
which states:1
The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means
*The author is grateful for assistance from the Council for Intersocietal Studies of Northwestern University in support of the research on which this article is based.
**A.B. 1929, Harvard College (chemistry); A.M. 1934, Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy (international relations); Ph.D. 1938, Harvard University (economics); Professor
of Economics, Northwestern University, 1948-date.
1. The Employment Act was signed on February 20, 1946. The philosophy of the Act
was in part Keynesian, in the sense that the possibility was recognized that deficit spending
ought not to be excluded from consideration if the cessation or reduction in military spending were likely to be followed by a depression. At the same time, the Act did not accept
the view that the government is simply the handmaiden of the private sector, in the sense
that a decline in private investment and consumption spending should be offset by a rise
in public spending, and conversely. Rather, the responsibility of the federal government
was regarded as that of setting up a close watch on economic developments, and of undertaking whatever measures seemed appropriate to keep the economy on an even keel. To that
end two agencies were established with primary responsibility and authority in the hands
of the President. These agencies were the Council of Economic Advisers and the Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Economic Report. The latter has authored a long list of
highly useful studies. For a recent summary of experience under the Employment Act see
THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIc ADVISERS ch. 7 (1966).
[464]
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consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential considerations of national policy, with the assistance and cooperation of industry,
agriculture, labor, and State and local governments, to coordinate and
utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating
and maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free
competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under whith
there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including
self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to
promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.
A precise evaluation of the efficiency of stable growth policy can be had,
of course, only in the context of a mathematical model, where the standard
of performance is clear-cut. In the real world, on the other hand, there is
often room for a good deal of difference of opinion on the efficiency of
instruments of economic policy. The disagreement is largely justified, since
observers operate under different assumptions. But these assumptions are
often only implicit, since protagonists of various points of view unfortunately
are frequently ready to recommend actual policy without taking the trouble
to make their assumptions explicit, or to consider whether they indulge in
undue simplification of real world conditions.
In what follows, it is our intention to indicate some key points at which
the abstractions of economic theory differ from their real world counterparts.
By this route it is intended to illuminate the reasons for international and
intertemporal differences in the efficiency of policies for stable growth, and to
draw conclusions with respect to the potential for improvement. The following rubrics will be included in the performance of this task: the problem
of the benchmark, a basis for evaluation of policy; the question of the sturdiness of the instruments of stable growth policy; the relation between
instruments and targets, which on occasion may be ambiguous or fluctuating;
problems originating in conflicts among stable growth targets; and destabilizing effects of government intervention, illustrated by particular reference to
the capital market.
Before moving on to the next topic, it may be useful to call attention to
the widely varying concepts of planning in the countries of the Western
World. Planning is carried farthest in countries with three- or five-year plans,
in which investment and growth targets are hoped to be achieved by means
of goals set for the various sectors of the economy. France best exemplifies
this form of planning, both in terms of philosophy and performance. However, unexpected shocks from abroad, as well as incomplete control over the
decisions of domestic producers, may conspire to impair success.
Another form of planning (the Dutch) consists primarily of forecasts of
the movement of key economic variables, with reliance on conventional
(though sometimes novel) policy instruments rather than on outright planning. Emphasis is on the control of aggregate demand, and planning is on
an annual basis. In contrast with the emphasis on forecasts in the Netherlands, both Britain and the United States tend to pursue a policy of meeting
economic disequilibria as they arise. A similar philosophy underlies Germany's Law to Encourage Stability and Growth, enacted on June 8, 1967.
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Although in retrospect policies thus often appear to have been tardy or
inadequate, it cannot be simply assumed that gearing policies to formal
economic forecasts is necessarily superior. The much vaunted Dutch incomes
policy, for example, ultimately broke down, shifting the distribution of
income in favor of labor and having the consequence of a reduction in the
rate of national saving and growth. A feeling for the differences in the attitudes and practice of the various nations with respect to degree and nature
of planning can be obtained from the Economic Surveys published from time
to time throughout the year by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development. Each survey is devoted to a particular member of OECD.
THE BENCHMARK PROBLEM

A few words need to be said at the outset about the difficulties that
confront any attempt to evaluate the efficiency of a policy of stable growth.
These difficulties can perhaps best be summarized in discussion of the benchmark. How do we know when success has been achieved? Does the benchmark
exist? Is there any validity to the concept of ideal stable growth, and therefore to that of ideal policy? As we have said above, in terms of an abstract
model it is easy to draw conclusions with respect to efficiency of policy, since
the target and the concept of efficiency are specified in the model. But the
model is the handmaiden of mathematics, and necessarily avoids the complexities of the real world that make it easy for a simplified model to be
misspecified.
The benchmark problem is much more serious than it might initially
appear, and there is evidence that emerging differences among nations in
"national purpose" may make it increasingly so. Obviously not all countries
(nor any country at all times) pursue the twin benchmarks of, say, five per
cent annual rate of growth in Net National Product (NNP) and an aggregate
unemployment rate that never exceeds a figure such as three per cent. These
are arbitrary goals, and therefore may even be naYve. Moreover, they may
have to be temporarily shelved in order to pursue other objectives that,
within limits, may be quite as important. It might be agreed, for example,
that if the unemployment rate did not exceed five per cent, or the growth
rate of NNP did not drop below three per cent, other social objectives that
tend to conflict with these would be given first consideration.
Noneconomic Goals
Following customary practice we shall exclude noneconomic national
goals from the realm of discourse. But this does not mean that they exert
no influence on the growth goal of a particular country. What price might
France, for example, have to pay in terms of domestic price or interest rate
stability, or in terms of a target growth rate, in order to strive for a position
of dominance in the West European capital market? 2 Since the objective
2.

Asserted to be the aim of Debrd. See

NATIONAL CITY BANK LETRr
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would be mainly prestige rather than efficient capital formation and distribution, we may suppose that the price could be positive and significantly
large. Again, what is the cost in terms of aggregate growth rate if, in the
interest of regional objectives, France aims at deemphasizing the overwhelming economic importance of Paris; or if Britain makes tax concessions to
encourage industry to settle in poorly endowed areas; or if Italy pours resources into the hardly viable Mezzogiorno? These sectoral and largely noneconomic aims inevitably affect the aggregate economic variables that are normally regarded as major policy objectives, namely, saving and investment, per
capita net national product, productive capacity, aggregate employment, and
personal income or consumption. But noneconomic considerations differ
widely from country to country. Each is imbedded in its own national matrix
of institutions, past history, national ethos, and so on. Thus we encounter
at the outset thorny problems in achieving meaningful international comparisons of stable growth performance, or in making valid inferences from the
experience of a single nation. No single standard of performance can fairly
be applied to all countries, or permanently to any one country.
Growth and Stability: Meaning and Standards
The problem is further complicated by the fact that differences of opinion
exist with respect to the meanings of growth and stability. Thus, in addition
to the obscurity surrounding the benchmark technique, we have the problem
of selecting generally accepted measures of growth and stability. Consider
the list of policy objectives set forth in the preceding paragraph. If one
nation picks as its criterion of economic growth the percentage annual increment of physical capital, while another regards aggregate consumption as the
best measure of growth, their respective performances will depend largely
on which measure of growth is selected as the basis for comparison. But the
complication goes deeper. Additions to capital increase productivity and
output capacity, so that the nation that stresses physical investment over
consumption should creep ahead. Suppose, however, that a substantial part
of private consumption expenditure is on education. This investment in
human capital ultimately may prove more productive than investment in
physical capital, and this distorts the whole picture once again. Important
types of consumption may be as growth-stimulating as are savings devoted to
investment in physical capital. Thus, plant capacity can hardly be taken as
an unambiguous measure of growth.
An interesting aspect of the benchmark problem is the fact that standards
of stable growth performance have been changing in response to the learning
process. Two important reasons for this are: (1) progress in the theory of
quantitative economic policy, and (2) accumulation of experience with
"fiscal dirigism," 3 econometric models, and national planning. Indicative
3. The French term for government interference in the market mechanism through
fiscal measures. Germany's new stable growth law explicitly excludes specific measures intended to interfere with the market mechanism.
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of changing standards is the disagreement, in the United States at least, over
the relative social utility of a little inflation and a little unemployment. But
dialogue tightens critical standards. At any rate, as the public is encouraged
by economists to expect higher standards of performance, complaints are
heard with respect to policies that earlier would have been regarded quite
adequate.
Another difficulty confronting the use of target benchmarks is that commentators on policy almost necessarily restrict their major attention to the
desired target (say full employment or a stable cost-of-living index), and to
the policy instrument employed to reach it. It is sometimes difficult, but
always important, for critics also to take into account the varying scope and
intensity of the disequilibrating factors that necessitate discretionary governmental action. Otherwise, it may be scientifically meaningless to speak of
"success" or "failure" of a national policy. These factors may be exogenous
shocks of considerable magnitude, as for example the serious setback administered to the French Fifth Plan during 1966-1967 by the decline in demand
for her exports associated with the sharp recession in West Germany, or
the strong demand for labor that destroyed the Netherlands incomes policy in
the mid-sixties.
STURDINESS Or THE INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY

The Effect of Economic Events on Instruments of Policy
Economic events may mar the effectiveness of the policy instrument itself.
A given disequilibrating shock may not only remove the relevant economic
(or target) variable from its desired course, but may also weaken the
strength or the appropriateness of one or more policy variables on which we
depend to restore equilibrium. It is precisely this kind of consideration that
invalidates the traditional contraposition of monetary and fiscal policy.4 Some
economists appear to think the choice is always between one or the other.
This is by no means true in a dynamic industrial economy. Continually
changing circumstances determine when one or the other is appropriate, or
which combination should be utilized.
A striking example of this second type of disequilibrium has occurred
with respect to monetary policy. A consequence of the Keynesian Revolution 5
was the belief that monetary policy is ineffective a good deal of the time,
either because we find ourselves "pushing on a string" (in using it to try to
4. Further discussed following subheading CONFLICrS AMONG STABLE GROWTH TARGETS.
5. The term "Keynesian Revolution" refers to the revolution in the views of economists
(and later of policy men) with respect to causes of, and the cure for, unemployment on the
scale experienced during the thirties. In the opinion of many economists it involved a
belief that stabilization policy must depend primarily on the tax and spending policies of
central governments, with monetary policy taking a back seat. Events connected with high
levels of employment during and after World War II have led economists to treat the
Keynesian Revolution as one important aspect of a more general approach to the adoption
of economic policies in pursuit of stable economic growth.
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get out of a depression), or because the need to stabilize the value of federal
debt inhibits freedom of the Federal Reserve authorities (vide the period
from Pearl Harbor to the "Accord" between the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury in March 1951).6 During the fifties came the celebrated "revival
of monetary policy," made possible under the Accord by release of the
monetary authority from the necessity of financing federal deficits in an
inflationary manner during periods of high level output and employment.
The situation reversed itself again in the sixties, however, by a renewed loss
of freedom caused by pressure on the balance of payments. It was felt that
short-term rates had to be maintained at a level high enough to limit the
outflow of short-term capital, but this in turn contributed to difficulties in
the long-term capital market.
The effect of shocks and disequilibria on the efficiency or propriety of a
particular policy instrument may be strongly influenced by the complex of
circumstances in which a nation finds itself at a particular moment of time.
This is notably illustrated by the fact that the problems encountered by
Britain in connection with the perennial pressure on the pound, and her
reaction to them, differed substantially from those of the United States in
rather similar circumstances.7 Her efforts to maintain full employment and a
high rate of investment and productivity have been hampered by balance of
payments difficulties. During 1966 a series of fiscal and other measures were
taken to help restore balance, but in the latter part of the year it was decided
that steps taken in earlier months had produced too much unemployment. 8
(However, any quick reversal of policy might have led to a run on sterling
owing to loss of confidence by international bankers.) Britain's credit
restriction in the summer of 1966 apparently had considerably more general
(and less distorting to resource use) effects than did rising interest rates in
the United States, although the unemployment effects followed quickly, since
labor forced out of nongrowth industries was not quickly absorbed into more
highly productive uses. It was reported in the press in October 1966 that
6. The Accord brought to an end the policy pursued during and after World War 11
that made the Federal Reserve System subservient to the Treasury. In order to hold interest
rates down to the low levels obtaining at the end of the Great Depression (and thus to
hold down the interest cost of a vastly rising federal debt in wartime), the Federal Reserve
System was obligated to support the price of United States Government securities. This

policy, necessary in a major war financed to a large extent by government borrowing,
eliminated for the duration the power of the monetary authority to control inflationary
pressure. Not until the Accord of 1951 was the Federal Reserve System finally allowed to
pursue a policy of restricting its support to "maintaining orderly conditions" in the government securities market. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL
REPORT 8 et seq. (1951).
7. The remarks in the text do not relate to events subsequent to the devaluation of
the pound from $2.80 to $2.40 in November 1967.
8. The most striking of these measures was a tax applied to business firms, on the basis
of the number of employed persons, the proceeds of which were to be used to provide a
subsidy to growth industries (thus with the objective of drawing manpower out of service
industries into manufacturing industry). A difficulty was that workers were not rapidly
reabsorbed, so that unemployment rose as a consequence. Tightened credit policy and the
prospect of falling investment made the situation still worse, and steps had to be taken
to help reverse the downswing.
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British firms were experiencing difficulty in making the investment that was
counted upon to improve the nation's balance of trade. The constraint
imposed on monetary policy by balance of payments difficulties therefore
had quite different effects in the two countries in terms of investment, distribution of resource use, supply of housing, and even on the very trade
balance that had played a part in the initial disequilibrium.
Incompatibility of Goals
A final problem that confronts evaluation of stable growth performance
is the fact that the goals of stability and growth are not necessarily compatible. Moreover, the degree of their incompatibility varies in response
to the operation of factors not subject to government control. A given target
rate of growth may produce inflationary pressure if resources are spottily distributed throughout the economy, and given stabilization policies may inhibit growth in particular circumstances. An alleged example of growth inhibition was the temporary lifting in the fall of 1966 of the investment credit,
which had been introduced in 1962 under the Kennedy administration for the
purpose of stimulating investment and growth. Because of inevitable lags
between any cutback in investment plans owing to removal of the credit and
the decline in actual investment spending resulting from the cutback, it was
widely believed that the major effect of what was intended as a brake to
inflationary spending would instead turn out to be somewhat of a drag on
the growth rate of the United States.
The above discussion of the benchmark problem should serve to make
apparent the near hopelessness of trying to evolve anything approaching
watertight criteria for effective stable growth policy in practice. At the same
time, economists and others will hardly refrain from calling attention to
particular instances of policy measures that do or do not appear to be appropriate or effective. The readers of such critiques are on warning, for such
judgments may be only partial. It is a difficult matter to evaluate a policy
move, because the critic as well as the policymaker must be judged in the
light of all the arguments of the social welfare function, weighted in a socially
agreed manner. He must not content himself merely with those that happen
to interest him. If he does, criticism may turn out to be irrelevant or, worse
still, misleading in the absence of an explicit statement of the critic's own
view of the social welfare function.
THE RELATION BETWEEN INSTRUMENTS AND TARGETS

Instruments and Targets in Models
Clearly it is only possible for a central government to pursue an efficient
policy for stable growth if the planners have firmly in mind a set of relations
believed to obtain among the basic variables of the economy. These relationships are expressed in the form of equations, and in the interest of simplicity
the equations are linear when possible. That is, a dependent variable (y)
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moves in a fixed relationship (b) to movements in an independent variable (x),
in the equation y = a + bx. Once the modelbuilder has decided upon the
relations that he deems most significant for his purposes, he expresses them in
the form of equations, and the set of equations is his model.
In considering the relation between policy instruments (like monetary
or fiscal policy) and targets (full employment, price stability, desired rate
of growth, et cetera) we distinguish between positive and normative models.
In the former, assumptions are made about the nature of disequilibrating
shocks that move the economy from equilibrium and about the effect of
independent variables on the dependent variables. Inferences are then drawn
about what will happen. To illustrate, in a positive model a decline in the
level of government spending leads to a decline in aggregate income, and
thence to a decline in consumption spending and saving. The outcome is
logically inevitable once the assumptions and relationships among the variables are specified. A normative model reverses this procedure. Targets become the independent variables, from which we work back to policies (the
dependent variables), thence selecting the policies that give the best prospect
of achieving our goals.
In models of the national economy it is customary to distinguish clearly
between dependent (target) variables and independent (policy or instrument) variables. In some instances these roles may be reversed. 9 Modelbuilders take cognizance of the complexity of economic life by first carefully
selecting the important variables, and then separating them into a vector of
independent variables (x,, x 2, . . . x.), and a vector of dependent variables
(Y, Y21 .... yr) .10 The more target variables that are selected the more policy
variables are needed. Indeed, if some of the refinements of theory are ignored,
one may conclude that a model requires as many independent variables as
dependent variables (although in reduced form equations one or more of
the latter may be "irrelevant," that is, variables whose values are not of
interest in the context of a given model). Another important point is that
targets may be either fixed or variable. For example, one may, in a shortterm model, set up as a target a level of gross national product that corresponds to full employment. In a longer-term model the objective may be
more complicated, say to achieve a given rate of increase over an indefinite
period of time in GNP, employment, or some other key variable. This obviously complicates the mathematics of the model, although it should be noted
that the same thing may not be true of actual policy. The reason is that
policy can be revised at frequent intervals on the basis of information fed
back from the behavior of target variables. This may be regarded as an
9. An example might be tax rates and tax receipts. When rates are set, receipts are
determined by tax rates in conjunction with the behavior of economic variables such as
income, spending, et cetera. But a later government decision to increase or decrease receipts would require a change in tax rates, which now become the dependent or target

variable.
10. Cf. J. TINBERGEN, ON THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY (1952); K. Fox, J. SFNGUPTA
& E. THORBECKE, THE THEORY OF QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY chs. 1, 2 (1966) and other
cited works.
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instance in which a real world problem turns out to be less difficult than
would be implied by the simpler mathematical model.
Obviously the purpose in building a normative model is to provide
criteria for optimum policy.11 The objective is to maximize some social
welfare function that under full scale planning is defined by the national
planning board, and that under the conventional mixed economy (for example, the United States) is the government's interpretation of the supposed
desires of the electorate. It is likewise clear that (assuming their welfare
costs equal) a policy is superior that reaches the desired goal more quickly
than does its rival, and that a dependable policy (one with a small variance)
is to be preferred to one that is less so. It is not within the province of this
article even to hint at the mathematics involved in these considerations.
Rather, the purpose will be, on the basis of the experience of OECD industrial nations, to indicate the nature of the gap that necessarily exists between
actual experience in policy and the (quite properly) simplified relationships,
or equations, utilized by modelbuilders. This part of our discussion will be
restricted to two major aspects; namely: conflicts among stable growth targets,
and destabilizing effects of government resource use as exemplified by its
activity in capital markets.
Limitations of Models in Evaluating Efficiency of Policy
Evaluation in terms of a mathematical model must be left to the technician. A model judges the objective and success of policy in terms of its
variables and functional relationships. A policy is deemed efficient by reference to the characteristics of the model only. Unfortunately, but obviously, it
is far more difficult to evaluate the efficiency of actual stable growth policy
as practiced by a particular nation. One would not say that the policy of
Country A is efficient or inefficient on the basis of conclusions reached by a
model that contains variables or assumptions differing from those explicitly
or implicitly accepted by Country A's policymakers. Two tasks are required:
(1) the agreed findings of the modelbuilders must be taken into account, and
(2) consideration must be given to the differences as well as the similarities
among the compared nations with respect to (a) the economic problems they
confront, and (b) the preference function that they are striving to optimize.
However useful international (or even intertemporal) comparisons of growth
rates may be, no table of numbers can take into account either portion of
the second of these tasks. Quite apart from the obscuring statistical difficulties of numerical comparisons stands the impropriety of comparing performance on the basis of a ranking when the problems faced may be entirely
different, and the short- and long-term national objectives may differ as well.

11.

Cf. K. Fox, J. SENCUPTA & E.

THORBECKE,

supra note 10, at 13.
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Measurement of Growth
Perhaps the simplest problem is to select the measure of growth that
it is proposed to maximize (or optimize) .12 Here the target is agreed upon,
and the question is merely how to reach it. But growth economists offer
competing measures. Among the major alternatives are productive capacity,
GNP or GNP per person (a common but not always very informative choice
because of the relative ambiguity of the data), real net national product,
national income or national income per capita, output per man-hour, and
consumption (chosen by some because the objective of all economic activity
is ultimately consumption) .23 Most of these variables tend to move in the
same direction both cyclically and secularly, though at different rates. Cumulative effects on a nation's output potential are produced on the basis of
"permanent" selection of a target variable.
A question arises whether it ultimately matters that a mature industrial
nation chooses the consumption target in preference to, say, productive
capacity. The answer lies partly in how rapidly an economy can build up its
real capital in response to a change in policy. Post-World War II experience
indicates that this can be accomplished very quickly indeed, so that perhaps
what is really required is flexibility of choice rather than the perfect choice at
a moment of time. An outstanding example was West Germany, whose
phenomenal growth rate in the fifties stemmed from a high rate of saving
and investment, coupled with concentration of output in manufacturing
(at the expense of various types of consumption, including services), in
which the rate of productivity increase is high. Subsequently the German
growth rate slowed down markedly as wage rates and personal consumption
were driven up, and the composition of demand became less favorable to
the more productive industries.
CONFLICTS AMONG STABLE GROwTH TARGETS

Multiplicity of Instruments and Targets
An instrument variable is likely to have effects on a number of different
targets. Correspondingly, a given target variable may be affected by the
behavior of a number of instruments. Consequently, models of the economy
must simplify these relationships. Moreover, the modelbuilder is not interested in what happens to all the target variables. A simple model might take
only such variables as the balance of payments and the level of employment. Additional dependent variables included in the model but not of
immediate interest might be consumption, GNP, or the money supply. Of
12. Many would disagree with the view into which many publicists and economists slip,
namely, that it is, or should be, a nation's objective to maximize the rate of economic
growth. Some may believe, to the contrary, that nations must in the immediate future
learn to live with a stable population, with growth restricted to the fruits of technological
progress. Thus technological progress, not growth, would be the maximand.
13. A meaningful concept of consumption would have to include public as well as
private consumption.
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course there are feedbacks from these "irrelevant" variables to the action or
instrument variables, but this simply means that in order to obtain desired
values for the target variables the values of the instruments must be such as
to include neutralization of undesired feedbacks.
The situation is different with respect to the relevant, or target, variables.
When a given effect is desired with respect to, say, the level of employment,
the instruments chosen to accomplish this may produce undesired effects on
one or more variables that likewise are the objectives of policy. The price
level may be forced up, or import demand may rise (which may not only
affect adversely the balance of payments, but because of the import leakage
may reduce the effectiveness of the attempt to increase employment). These
conflicts obviously can seriously reduce the efficiency of control policy, particularly in a country that depends heavily on international trade. The two
major conflicts evidenced in the United States since World War II have been
exemplified by (1) the dilemma of maintaining full employment without
inflation, and (2) the problem of maintaining equilibrium in the balance
of payments in the face of an extensive range of foreign commitments that
involve both public and private sectors.
Evaluation of the efficiency of stable growth policy is strongly conditioned
by intertemporal and international differences in the relative importance
to be assigned to each variable in the vector of targets. For this in turn
determines the optimum combination of instrumental variables. Moreover,
different targets involve different degrees of difficulty of achievement, and
when tasks differ it may not be easy to evaluate the comparative efficiency
of stable growth policies. For example, an open economy, striving for equilibrium in the balance of payments, may appear superficially to be less efficient with respect to policy than a closed economy aiming at inflation
control.

14

Intertemporal differences in targets deserve a special word, for they may
result in faulty judgment with respect to the performance of a given country
through time. Circumstances exogenous to the economic system may compel
the planning authority to alter the relative importance assigned to the several
targets, or may require inclusion of previously irrelevant variables in the list
of target variables. This in turn may require reconsideration of the relative
emphasis to be placed on the several instrument variables. The essence of
economic life is dynamics and change. Growth may be the primary objective
at one time, price stability at another, fixed investment at another, balance
of payments at another, and so on. Consequently, it is difficult to see how any
set criterion (for example, the growth rate) can be applied usefully to
evaluate changes in the performance of a particular country over time.

14. An open economy is one heavily dependent upon international trade (for example,
Britain or the Netherlands). A closed economy is one whose domestic trade far exceeds in
importance its foreign trade (the United States, U.S.S.R.). The distinction is, of course, a
loose one.
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A special kind of model would be one in which there is only one independent variable for each dependent variable. That is, each target would be
affected solely by one instrument variable, along with, of course, the uncontrollable data variables. (The latter are the economic inputs to which the
instrument variables are applied.) Here there would be no question of
interdependency. The model not only would have a solution (as many
targets as instruments), but the pairing would mean that sectoral decisions
could be made independently of one another. To illustrate, assume that the
central bank controls short-term interest rates, and therefore the international movement of short-term capital. 15 Assume also that the fiscal authority
controls the flow of saving, given the public's propensity to save, through taxation and budgetary balance. This is a strict division of labor between the
two authorities, the central bank concerning itself with external equilibrium
only and the fiscal authority determining solely the rate of saving. If the
control authority wished to make savings available to business firms through
surpluses in the government's budget, a third function would have to be
performed. The long-term interest rate would need to be manipulated so
that the savings flow was translated into private investment, and thence into
the target rate of growth. 16 This might be performed by a third agency. The
central planning authority would, of course, retain the function of integrating
these separate operations at the top. It would decide on the goals of investment, growth, and balance of payments. But the sectors would execute these
policies independently of one another.
The possibility of pairing targets and instruments has been the subject
of vigorous debate at the policy level. As mentioned earlier, most debate has
centered around the respective roles of monetary policy and fiscal policy in

economic stabilization. 7 The question asked is whether monetary and fiscal
policy should be separate instruments, expected to act on distinct target
Variables, or whether they should be combined to produce desired results on
one or more targets. In other words, is it a question of monetary policy or
fiscal policy when a particular target is examined, or should monetary and
fiscal policy be regarded as mutually supporting (synergetic) ?18
Even a cursory survey of the literature makes it apparent that disagreement on this matter is deep-seated indeed. It may be worthwhile to present
15. This also assumes no retaliation by central banks of other countries.
16. The debate over "operation twist" indicates the practical difficulties confronting an
attempt to keep short- and long-term interest policy separate.
17. Monetary policy, ordinarily in the hands of the central bank (though often subject
to control by the government of the day), mainly takes the form of control over the
discount rate and the money supply. Fiscal policy is concerned with a direct impact on
total spending via tax and public spending policy. Under this distinction debt management is an aspect of monetary policy.
18. A classic model in which the policies are treated as having distinct functions is
Mundell, The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External
Stability, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, STAFF PAPERS 70 (1962) where "[i]t is assumed" that monetary and fiscal policy are usable as distinct instruments. The former
ought to be aimed at external objectives and the latter at internal objectives.
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a random selection of points of view, with respect to which the underlying
assumptions are made clear. (Protagonists often do not indicate explicitly
the assumptions on which their conclusions are based, nor do they usually
consider the effect of disaggregation of their models. Again, little is said
about standards of comparison or measures of efficiency, and quantitative
evaluation is likewise usually lacking. For this reason it is often unfortunate
that recommendations for actual policy are made at all.)
(1). In the so-called naive multiplier model, in which changes in the
transactions' demand for money associated with changes in the level of
national income do not affect the interest rate, fiscal policy displaces
monetary policy entirely.19
(2). "I repeat: With proper fiscal and monetary policies, our economy
can have full employment and whatever rate of capital formation and
growth it wants."20 Samuelson calls attention to this admittedly "simplified exposition."
(3). Alvin Hansen has argued 2' that tax rates ought to be varied,
both cyclically and in the long run, so that aggregate public and private
spending will take off the market the potential supply of goods and
services of which the economy is capable. He argues that while monetary policy is a necessary policy instrument, it is not sufficient by itself.
(4). The central banker's point of view is illustrated by a statement
by Alfred Hayes, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 22 Pressure
should be taken off the monetary instrument through "deliberate" use of
fiscal policy. Otherwise, overuse of monetary policy could produce a
financial crisis, or a "serious reversal" of the economy, or both.
(5). An emphasis quite different from that of President Hayes is
found in a statement by Arthur Smithies. 2 3 Smithies fears that fiscal
policy is too clumsy an instrument to bring an inflationary movement to
a halt, for it may unduly restrict expenditures on plant and equipment.
He would assign the major role to general and selective credit policy.
(6). Robert Eisner's position is a strong one: "I am of the school
that believes that money should not matter. The cost of being liquid
should be made virtually zero so that investment can be carried to the
maximum rate consistent with the production function and time preference as between present and future goods before government fiscal intervention is added to the system. This precludes, I may point out, use of
monetary policy as a counter-cyclical device .... ." His
reasons for this
24
view may be found in the extension of this quotation.

19. Ritter, The Role of Money in Keynesian Theory, in
162 (M. Mueller ed. 1966).
20.

P.

SAMUELSON,

GROWTH AND STABILITY

JOINT

ECONOMIC

COMMITTEE,

FEDERAL

READINGS IN MACROECONOMICS

TAX

POLICY

FOR

ECONOMIC

233 (1955).

21.

THE POSTWAR AMERICAN ECONOMY 16

22.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK oF

(Norten ed. 1964).
N.Y., MONTHLY REV. 236 (Nov. 1966).
23. Smithies, Uses of Selective Credit Controls, in THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, UNITED
STATES MONETARY POLICY 82 (C.N. Jacoby ed. 1958).
24. Fiscal and Monetary Policy for Economic Growth, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC
POLICY, MICH. BUSINESS PAPERS No. 44, at 25 (M. Ross ed. 1967).
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The Government as a User of Real Resources
The central government not only has the task of striving for stable growth,
but is itself a user of economic resources on a vast scale. This fact not only
serves to constrain its independence with respect to stable growth policy, but
may itself complicate the task of stabilization. The problem is particularly
acute under the federal form of government. There are still other constraints
imposed by government on itself that may affect unfavorably the pursuit of
stable growth policy, but they will not be considered here. Among the most
important are policy with respect to the distribution of income and wealth,
the control of monopoly of business and labor, and regional development.
The problem is particularly difficult under conditions other than full
scale planning. In these circumstances society relies largely on a kind of
"invisible hand" 25 to determine the role of government with respect to (1)
the balance between private and public investment (and thus the nature of
growth), (2) the ratio of private to public consumption, and (3) the extent
to which government is expected to time its expenditures, as well as
the way they are financed, so as to even out short-term fluctuations in the
private sector. Military expenditures, which in the United States form such a
large proportion of total central government spending, are the most important of the rigid elements. To be sure, on occasion (for example, the summer
of 1957 when spreadouts and cutbacks were effected in order to slow down
an upswing) they have been slightly countercyclical. But in general they are
appropriately regarded as predetermined, that is, exogenous to the economic
system.
The complications of the invisible hand are far too great for discussion
here, but the nature of the problem can be well illustrated by reference to
recent years' experience with the role of government in the capital market.
"Excessive" competition between the public and private sectors for capital is
evidence of a failure of society's decision mechanism to allocate resources
between the two sectors in an orderly fashion.26 Decisions on the level and
kinds of government spending have been made before the several levels of
government take steps to ensure their participation in the flow of savings.
If total planning in terms of real resource use were perfect, and if steps
25. That is, the operation of market forces, including the "market" for public goods and
services that operates via the actions of voters and their representatives in government.
There is a rather substantial amount of recent literature on the question of the invisible
hand. An instructive discussion of the distinction between the invisible hand of Adam
Smith and that of a liberal economy like that of Germany under the guidance of Ludwig
Erhard, may be found in F. REuss, FISCAL POLICY FOR GROWTH WnTOUT INFLATION Ch. 3

passim (1963).
26. The concept of the invisible hand would allow, of course, for moderate competition
among the various claimants to financial and real capital. But the kind of competition to

which reference is made in the text is, by definition, a failure of the capital markets to
reflect society's real decisions with respect to the allocation of the flow of capital.
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were taken to make certain that plans were in fact carried into effect, there
would be no need to scramble for money capital to finance public and private
projects. The capital market would be a passive, merely lubricating, mechanism reflecting those prior real decisions. The keen competition and occasional
queueing for investment funds that has been particularly noteworthy in the
mid-sixties, however, is sufficient indication of lack of coordination in the
27
allocation of real resources as between the public and private sectors.
Scope for Government Intervention To Affect the Long-Term Rate of Saving

The role of government in affecting the long-term saving rate, and therefore the rate of investment and economic growth, is somewhat problematical.
The answer to the question hinges partly on how far individuals' aggregate
long-term average and marginal propensities to consume are susceptible to
change by instruments at the disposal of the government. One view is that
the important determinants of the rate of saving are population structure
and real income per capita. This means that aggregate forces, rather than
individuals' psychological propensities, are the main force in the determination of the rate of saving. Therefore, governmental policies aimed at influencing these propensities would be of a second order of importance in
comparison with the level of real income and its distribution over the
population.
The truth of this contention rests on the general assertion that individuals
are lifetime consumers. If so, there is little scope to affect their saving out
27. The nature of the role of government in the process of creating and participating
in the distribution of savings can be seen from the following outline, which forms the
basis of the remainder of this article.
The Role of Government in the Creation and Distribution of Savings
Scope for affecting the long-term rate of saving
The impact of tax structure on the efficiency of the capital market
The special status of government in the distribution of savings
The levels of government: central, provincial, local
Limitations: Constitutional, statutory, self-imposed
Special privileges: preemption, advantages to public sector issues,
nationalized industries' pricing policy, et cetera
Inflationary finance in the hands of government
Fiscal powers of government over the creation and use of savings
Budget surpluses:
Their origin and effect on the net rate of saving
Alternative uses: public and private
Budget deficits
Their origin and effect on the net rate of saving

The impact of deficit finance on the allocation of savings
Government intervention in the capital market
Interference in the interest rate structure and the rationing of capital

Privileges to particular types of private borrowers
Destabilizing and adverse welfare effects of noncoordination of policy
Possibilities of coordination

Government intervention to affect the level of internal financing by firms.
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of disposable income. The vast bulk of the population at present does indeed
consume its entire lifetime disposable income, doing its saving in middle age
and consuming these savings during retirement. The real scope for influencing the saving of this broad group is limited to measures aimed at increasing
the real income of those on the threshold of being lifetime savers, and at
affecting the age distribution of the population. In other words, a dynamic
society gets possession of a net annual increment of savings by virtue of (1)
a gradual increase in the aggregate size of "permanent" family fortunes, and
(2) an imbalance between the working and retired population, such that
saving by the former in a given year exceeds spending by the latter.2 Clearly,
a temporary population bulge in the forty to sixty age group will cause aggregate saving to be relatively high. Again, if productivity should continue to
increase rapidly after individuals' consumption desires have approached a
ceiling, more and more people would become lifetime savers. The population
bulge is a temporary phenomenon, whose importance must gradually decline
as the aged become relatively more numerous in the total population; and
the extent of increasing productivity must remain in the realm of speculation,
since we cannot now predict the expansibility of consumers' wants.
The role of government in affecting the size of the flow of saving, and,
thus, of investment and growth, is not restricted, however, to the modest one
of affecting the rate of productivity increase and the size and time-contour
of the population. Governmental powers can be utilized to affect the beforetax incomes of individuals, preventing substantial rises above currently accepted levels of living, and siphoning the released proceeds into the savings
stream. This it can do through policies aimed at modifying the flow of internal
funds to business (through policy toward monopoly pricing, spending policies, and tax concessions favoring the withholding of profits from distribution
to stockholders), and through taxes that reduce personal incomes or absorb
consumer purchasing power through product price rises. In underdeveloped
economies it is customary to hold incomes down virtually to subsistence by
a combination of policies aimed at maximizing the rate of saving. In other
28. The following quotation illustrates this point very well: "The 'budget' of the
consumer sector characteristically shows a surplus-an excess of disposable income plus
depreciation of houses, over the combined total of personal consumption expenditures and
residential construction. Indeed, during the period 1947-62, the consumer sector was in
surplus in every year except 1947. The average surplus in that period was about $6.5
billion." THE

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL

OF

ECONOMIC

ADvIsERs

75 (1963).

Despite the views of early enthusiasts for the use of a progressive tax system to redistribute income downward, subsequent research tends to support the view that relatively
little scope exists for affecting the aggregate rate of saving and the growth rate by this
device. Thus, Musgrave finds (COMMISSION ON MONEY AND CRErr, FISCAL AND DEBT MANAGEMENT POLICIES 70 (1963)) that according to his estimates viable changes in the individual income-consumption tax structure would have only very modest effects on the growth
rate. An added sidelight on the question is the consensus of the contributors to the
Brookings volume FOREIGN TAX POLIcIEs AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 36 (E. Keith, ed. 1966)
that in the seven countries represented in the study, measures to encourage saving by
lower bracket income receivers are not very effective. They do help to offset tax advantages
(such as the investment credit) to higher income groups, but beyond that their main
effect is to change the form in which the lower income groups lodge their savings.
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words, lifetime consumption is itself a flexible concept, subject to modification
through governmental fiscal and other policies. We conclude that government can affect the rate of saving, and thus of growth. But the efficiency
with which it does so, and the total role of government in the mechanism of
distribution of savings, are matters that require further discussion.
Tax Structure and Efficiency of the Capital Market
Apart from matters of tax efficiency and equity, measures taken to affect
the structure of a national tax system (including all levels of government)
may be directed at promoting growth and enhancing the built-in fiscal
stability of the system. These measures may, however, reduce the efficiency
of the capital market, and thus affect investment and growth adversely. A
correct evaluation can be made, therefore, only if both sets of effects are
taken into account. Nevertheless, it is not usual for nations to do this,
although it is probable that careful study of these capital market effects of
proposed modifications of tax structures would repay itself in terms of increased policy efficiency. incidentally, it is much easier to gauge the efficiency
of modifications in the tax structure than to estimate the effects of the tax
structure as a whole (just as it is easier to measure changes in capital stock
than capital stock itself). It should be added that there are a number of
alternative concepts and measures of an efficient capital market, so that it
is not an easy matter to rank national capital markets by their efficiency, let
alone to make inferences with respect to the effect of entire tax systems on
their mode of operation.

29

It may often be impracticable to enact changes in a tax system merely
in order to increase the efficiency of capital markets, and thus to contribute
imperceptibly to growth objectives. Tax systems are usually of minor importance among the totality of factors affecting the efficiency of capital markets.
Another reason (in addition to legislative inertia) is that tax characteristics
are usually what they are because of some objective unrelated to stable
growth. To illustrate, the European Economic Community Report 30 saw
as a means of obtaining a wider distribution of share holdings the reduction
of stiff realized capital gains tax rates, for example the fifty-one per cent
rate on capital gains of corporate holders in West Germany. Here an aspect
of the corporate income tax has some (indeterminate) effect on the efficiency
of the distribution of savings, and thus on investment and growth. Another
example would be a heavy stock transfer tax, which increased stockholders'
reluctance to buy and sell stocks and thus inhibited the efficient stockholders'
capital into the most productive uses. These, and similar tax provisions, are
29. See Scott, European Capital Markets, in NAT'L BANKING REV. 137 (1966), who finds
that no EEC country either heads or tails the list for all alternative measures of a good
capital market.

See also JOINT ECONOMIC COMMrrTEE, ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PRACTICES,

PAPER No. 3 (1964) (on European Capital Markets); O'Leary, The Financing of Capital
Formation in the United States and Soviet Russia, in ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY,
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CALVIN BRYCE HOOVER 160-92 (R. Smith & F. de Vyer ed. 1966).
30.

THE DEVELOPMENT

OF A

EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET

(1966)

(Dr. Segr , Chairman

of the Expert Committee).
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usually enacted for revenue purposes, their adverse effects on stable growth
(and thus in turn on revenues) being regarded as unimportant. Experts'
reports on national economic systems take a different view, however, and
occasionally a change is made in response to their suggestions.
The Special Status of Government as a Participantin the Savings Flow
Since the appearance of Keynes' General Theory more than thirty years
ago we have heard increasingly of the possibility of what is called "fine
tuning" of monetary and fiscal policy for stable growth, and especially for
stability (the more difficult task). This was a natural outgrowth of the
initial steps taken by Keynes entirely at the aggregative level. But fine
tuning assumes that governmental objectives other than that of stable growth
do not swamp the fineness of the tuning. In this and the following sections
we shall be concerned with three powers of government that tend to cast
some doubt on the progress of fine tuning in the twenty-one OECD countries.
These are (1) the assumption by government of a special status (either
superior or inferior to that of private borrowers) in the capital market, (2)
intervention by government in the structure of interest rates in the mechanism
for the rationing of capital, and (3) fiscal powers of the government over
the creation and use of savings.
The special position of governments as borrowers differs among the
several levels of government, as well as internationally. In some countries
borrowing by the central government enjoys an advantage compared with
borrowing by provinces and localities, owing to the obligation of the central
bank to make a market for central government securities,31 or even to take up
part of an issue as a permanent addition to its portfolio, which involves, of
course, creation of new money. Where lower instances of government have
.special fiscal powers rivaling those of the central government, they in fact
enjoy a privileged status in capital markets. But this is rare. An example
is the position of the West German Laender, whose accelerated borrowing in
1966 and 1967 contributed to borrowing difficulties in the private sector and
in the federal government as well. The priviliged status of Laender borrowing under the West German Constitution is well illustrated by the doubtful
restraint imposed upon the "Stability Law" (1967). This empowers the
federal government to restrict borrowing by the Laender.32 The Bundesrat,
which has veto power on federal laws affecting financial policy, is composed
of members of the Laender.
The real restraint on Laender borrowing is economic, namely, high interest rates and capital scarcity. In most federal economies the provinces and
localities are not subject to substantial advantages or disadvantages in the
31. However, there has been criticism in the United States that the federal government
lacks those services that (part of) the private sector derives from the investment bankers.
32. DEUTScHE BANK ECONOMIC R v. 7 (April 1967). For a concise and illuminating
account of the powers conferred on the Laender under the German form of federal government see PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFIcE OF Tm FED. GoV'T., GERMANY REPORTS (4th
ed. 1966). See also OECD, ECONOMIC SuRvEYS, Germany (1967).
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capital market. They have the advantage that derives from the "full faith
and credit" provisions that bolster confidence in their securities issues, as
well as the occasional preference by investors for public over private issues.
In the United States, exemption of interest paid on local governmental securities from federal income tax confers an advantage on these borrowers, and at
a disproportionate cost to the federal treasury. On occasion the central
government takes steps to place borrowing by inferior levels at a temporary
disadvantage, though the objective is usually economic stability rather than
directed resource use. In 1964, heavy borrowing abroad by local governments
and utility companies induced the Danish Government to reduce the inflationary impact by requiring temporary cessation of such borrowing. 33
Let us turn now to total public borrowing. What kind of evidence would
indicate a preferred position over private borrowing? Some information is
provided by table 20 of the Statistical Annex of the Segr6 report, as rearranged
by John Weiner.3 4 Private net issues of medium- and long-term fixed interest
securities were found to be very small in comparison with the sum of such
issues by national and local governments, special credit institutions, and
public enterprises. For the period 1960-1965 private enterprises accounted
for 8.5 per cent of total issues in Belgium, 14.8 per cent in France, 2.3 per
cent in Germany, and 10.1 per cent in Italy. Nothing can be inferred directly
from these data with respect to special advantages of the public sector in the
market for savings, but the smallness of private issues in the whole picture is
striking. The answer is partly supplied by national institutions and habits.
In some countries, government agencies (including nationalized industries)
perform an important part of the function of collecting the economy's savings.
An example is the large deficit (borrowing from the public) of the social
security system in France. Although public agencies sometimes make a
portion of these savings available to private undertakings, the greater part
is usually devoted to public forms of investment. Where this is a tradition,
numerous special advantages develop that favor public borrowing.
Certain types of capital market imperfections likewise may favor public
borrowing. The extent to which they do depends largely on the relative
agility of government and the private sector in developing capital instruments
designed to exploit these imperfections. The government "tailors" issues to
meet the convenience of different types of savers, while the private sector
develops new forms of financial intermediation. In both areas there are substantial differences in resourcefulness among nations.3 Governments may
obtain special concessions, particularly in connection with a "Five-Year
Plan," from nationalized commercial and savings banks, which accept shortterm deposits and convert them into long-term loans. Even if measures are
taken to limit this activity of the banking system, for example by increasing
the relative importance of contractual saving, government retains its advantage over the private sector in the capital market to the extent that contractual
33. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., MONTHLY REV. 228 (Oct. 1966).
34. LLOYD'S BANK REV. 22 (July 1967).
35. These and similar questions were being studied during 1966 by the Invisible Transactions Committee of the OECD. OECD REPORT (1967).
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saving is done under public rather than private auspices, in other words, the
social security system.
In conclusion, the role of inflationary finance in relation to the position
of government in the capital market must be mentioned. Governments
finance through bond issues, and inflationary finance may work against the
efficiency of the bond market as savers seek to hedge against inflation through
purchases of stocks and real estate. It is for this reason that some economists
have urged recourse by public borrowers (at least the central government) to
price-indexed bonds. Some have even urged that in addition to making
government securities issues more attractive to savers during a period
of inflation, purchasing power bonds would induce governments to give up
inflationary finance. It is argued that any increase in tax rates forced by
rising interest payments on the debt in response to rising prices would make
inflationary governmental finance inexpedient. This is highly doubtful,
however, and in any case no answer can be given without making use of a
carefully specified model. To illustrate: if the dollar-income elasticity of
central government tax yields were to exceed the elasticity of tax requirements
due to inflation, tax rates could actually be lowered. This would, taken by
itself, encourage rather than discourage inflationary finance. In any event
the social desirability of price escalation of central government bonds is put
in doubt by (1) the likelihood that such a course would be impossible to
inferior governmental units (in the absence of tax sharing with the central
government), as well as to private borrowers not having access to the stock
market, and (2) the virtual certainty that trade unions would likewise
insist on wage escalation. The inflationary impact, and the inequities of
increasingly general use of escalator contracts is a separate study in. itself.
But there is considerable doubt that the government should (as has occurred
in former years, for example, in France) take the lead in popularizing a
market rigidity of this kind. Viewed from the standpoint of the economy as
a whole, it has haphazard effects on resource use as well as on equity as
among economic groups.
Government and the Efficiency of the Market for Savings
Governments may play a part in the working of capital markets through
policy with respect to budget balance and by measures aimed at affecting
the distribution of the savings available to the private sector. The financing
of budget deficits and surpluses is a matter of concern to capital market
efficiency because of the magnitude, and frequent lumpiness, of government
financial operations. But central governments also play a role in the allocation of the private sector savings flow through intervention in the structure
(and level) of interest rates, and through measures to assist firms to enlarge
their cash flow, without the necessity of going into the outside capital market.
Brief note may be taken of the tendency of government deficit budgeting
all
governmental levels to preempt, in planless fashion, part of the savings
at
flow that might be absorbed by the private sector. The OECD points out
that the public budgets of member nations account at the present time for
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at least forty per cent of new bond issues.36 The consequence has been queues
of private borrowers, prohibition of certain types of private issues, and a
bias toward governmental over private sector resource use. A prominent
example is that of West Germany, where the Laender, during 1966-1967,
joined the national government in ignoring the state of the capital market
in floating new issues. Bund and Laender borrowing virtually drove private
borrowers out of the market, and adverse effects boomeranged on public
construction as well.3 7 The result of this uncontrolled competition for in-

vestable funds was that the capital market's function as allocator of resources
was severely impaired. If there is such a thing as balanced growth, it is not
likely to occur in these circumstances.
Government intervention in the interest rate structure, in rationing funds
among private borrowers, and in granting tax concessions to raise profit
rates and increase the flow of internal funds is, of course, a different matter
from unplanned competition with the private sector for savings. Planned
intervention is designed to direct real resources to points in the economy at
which their contribution to social welfare will be maximized. Here the
question is how far the objective is being realized or is in fact realizable, under
the piecemeal approach that governments use in enacting the relevant legislation.
Two points of view on this question are possible. One is that direct
measures are an important supplement to aggregative policy in that they
permit working in small increments, and thus contribute to the "fine tuning,"
which incidentally is also the goal of those who would like to see the executive empowered to vary certain tax rates in response to economic conditions.
By operating on the loan structure, it is argued, flexibility is introduced
into the system, and the capital control authority can guide the savings flow
in the public interest. The opposed view is that interferences in any market
are likely to mar its performance. 38 Interest is a price, and price flexibility
without interference is believed to be a precondition of efficiency of the
market. This raises the question of how far the interest rate, or rather the
entire structure of rates, is a satisfactory device for rationing capital. In view
of the differences in the sensitivity of various uses of capital to interest rate
changes, and in the light of the ad hoc character and lack of over-all coordination of governmental intervention with respect to interest rates, there is
no easy way to know whether a given measure moves us toward or away from
the "ideal" distribution of capital.
36. OECD OBSERVER 6 (April 1967).
37. DEUTSCHE BANK ECONOMIC REV. (April 1967).
38. For example, President Hayes, of the New York Federal Reserve Bank in the cited
speech reported in its November 1966 MONTHLY REVIEW, deplored government interference
in the capital market, with special reference to Regulation Q. In a wider context, Torsten
Carlsson argued in The Savings Shortage and Credit Policy, in 3 SKANDINAVISKA BANKEN
Q REV. 63, 67-68 (1966) that the Riksbank ought to come up with a "constructive overall
plan for the development of the credit and capital markets" in order to eliminate what he
called a "lopsidedness" in the distribution of savings. Of course it is a major task to decide
what is the optimum distribution of savings, and this task must be performed before a
plan can be developed.
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The question hardly will be settled here. An illustration should make it
apparent that although government intervention in- the capital market may
eliminate a bottleneck, or may direct capital temporarily to some point at
which it is unanimously agreed to be badly needed, the result is often only
too likely to make a hodgepodge of the rationing of savings. The investment
credit and accelerated depreciation are examples of such intervention in
the interest of stimulating the growth rate at full employment. The objective is to stimulate the flow of internal funds, and thus to spare firms the
necessity of going to the capital market; or, by increasing the profit rate,
to enable benefiting firms to pay a higher rate of interest on borrowed funds.
An obvious difficulty is that savings thus directed to qualifying firms must
be diverted from other borrowers. Unless we know who these are, nothing
definitive can be said of the social welfare and growth effects of the policy.
To the extent that the authorities are. correct in believing that internal
financing should be stimulated in order to put small- and medium-sized industry on a more nearly equal footing with firms having access to the capital
market, incentive tax policies aimed at facilitating internal financing may be
desirable. But the effects on growth are problematical. Some believe that
monopoly facilitates growth; others that it is a brake upon it. a9
The Role of Budget Surpluses in the Origin and Distributionof Savings
A glance at the national income accounts shows how government and business contribute to and take from the income and spending streams. Government does so by virtue of the difference between tax receipts and purchases
of goods and services plus transfer payments. Business contributes through
the difference between plant and inventory investment, and retained earnings
plus depreciation allowances.40 If both government and business are investing
and spending an amount greater than their receipts, they are increasing their
debt to the third sector, namely, the consumers. The latter group typically
saves in an industrial economy, and lends to government and business. The
combined budgetary balance of business and government is usually in deficit,
but when business runs a surplus because of unfavorable investment prospects
the national budget deficit tends to rise in response because of declining tax
receipts and higher transfer payments. Of course conscious compensatory
fiscal policy avoids sole reliance on these built-in flexible characteristics of the
budget, but rather aims at a combined public-private budget balance that
39. Thus, for example, it is argued by J. Steindle that the effect of oligopoly is to depress the rate of capital accumulation (and thus growth), because when oligopolists raise
prices to accumulate internal funds any expansionary effect on investment is quickly braked
precisely because of their oligopoly position. His view is that the incentive to invest in the
oligopolistic sector will be less than the corresponding disincentive in the competitive sector.
OXFORD INsTITUT OF STATIsTICs, MATURITY AND STAGNATION IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM, MONOGRAPH No. 4, 126-27 (1952). A view contrary to this would be that monopoly profits tend
to be concentrated in industries characterized by a high productivity and growth rate. It
does in fact seem to be true that the growth of the giant corporation has not adversely
affected the rate of capital formation or economic growth. But the debate goes on.
40. For a brief, but illuminating, discussion of public and private deficits and surpluses, see the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvIsERs 74-78 (1963).
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gives the best prospects of full employment without inflation. This may
involve either a government surplus or a deficit. Planning for growth means
striving for the optimum ratio of government and private saving and investment.
The national income accounts provide a threshold for understanding the
manner in which governmental deficits and surpluses affect the rate and
use of national saving. Government saving and borrowing are not simply
residuals, but in many countries are in large part determined by institutional
arrangements and a heterogeneous collection of public policies. Through
price policy of nationalized industries, deficits in the social security system,
profits of marketing boards, and the like, the pre-tax and post-tax income of
consumers can be affected. Thus the saving decision may be partly, or
even largely, taken from the latter and lodged in the hands of the government.
France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and West Germany are
prominent among the countries making considerable use of public saving, to
finance government investment or to provide investment funds for private
undertakings. 41 Norway is of particular interest. Despite substantial downward redistribution of income, which some, but by no means all, economists
believe would favor consumption and discourage capital formation and
42
growth, she actually enjoys one of the highest rates of investment in Europe.
This is accounted for in large part by a high rate of public saving and investment.
The debate over budget surpluses and public saving has received different
emphasis in the United States and in Western Europe. In the latter the primary inquiry has been who should have responsibility for the saving (and
investment) decision, but in this country emphasis has been largely on the
issue of economic stability. Despite the prevalence of budgetary deficits in
recent years, economists and economic interest groups have shown lively interest in the deflationary effects of budgetary surpluses and how to avoid
them. A budgetary surplus that does not quickly find its way into the income
stream is deflationary, and imposes a burden on the economy. During high
level employment there is no problem, but if there is "Keynesian" unemployment, means must be found to invest the surplus. 43 Distribution of this sur41. Cf. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, STUDIES OF GOVERNMENT FINANCE, FOREIGN TAX
POLICIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 35-37 (Keith ed. 1966). It is stated by Pierre Bauchet, P.
BAUCHEr, L'EXPERIENCE FRANCHISE DE PLANIFICATION (1958), in Wellisz, Economic Planning
in the Netherlands, France, and Italy, J. OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 268 (1960) that the French

Government during the fifties was providing about one-third of private investment funds,
controlling still another 40%.
42. Cf. L. SOLTOW, TOWARD INCOME EQUALITY IN NORWAY (1965), in ECONOMIC J. 480
(1967). See also T. DFRNBURG & R. MCDOUGALL, MACRo-ECONOmICs 77 (1963) and citations.
The desirability of a high rate of public saving has been questioned on the ground of a
possible incompatibility with a market economy. Cf. F. Neumark, in THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, STUDIES OF GOVERNMENT FINANCE, FOREIGN TAX POLICIES AND

ECONOMIC GROWTH

154 (Keith ed. 1966), who remarks that in West Germany public saving was continuing
at the high rate of 40% of total saving during the first half of the sixties.
43. The words of John Maynard Keynes may be recalled in this connection (THE
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 378 (1936)): "The State will have
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plus between public and private investment, moreover, is a serious matter for
balanced growth as well as for the economic power balance between government and industry.
Commentators tend to speak of a budgetary surplus as if it derived solely
from reduced private consumption; that is, the taxes that produce it are
often assumed to rest on consumption rather than on savings. Furthermore,
confidence is generally displayed in the capacity of interest rate policy to
assure the investment of that portion of the budgetary surplus that represents
a net addition to the savings stream. 44 It is not difficult to scent a possible
origin of the expression "fine tuning" in the view that tight tax policy (on consumers) and easy monetary policy go together at full employment. Both the
impact of tax rate increases on the flow of savings and the investment response
of an eased monetary policy are, in fact, so unclear that the monetary and
fiscal authorities must indeed tread cautiously if stable full employment is to
be achieved by this route. It is of considerable interest in this connection that
the President's Economic Report of January 1962, saw the need of tax policy
as a supplement to monetary policy in assuring investment of the budgetary
45
surplus. This is intended to be a step further in the art of fine tuning:
A government surplus is a form of saving .... if the necessary investment demand is present, the surplus will make possible the acceleration of economic growth by enlarging the future productive power of
the economy. The Government is seeking to help American industry
to meet this challenge and seize this opportunity, through such measures
as the 8 per cent investment tax credit and revisions of depreciation
guidelines.
The investment credit'was introduced by the Kennedy administration as
a device to promote growth, not as an economic stabilizer. If it is true that
the American economy stands in need of a permanent stimulus of this kind,
it is incorrect to say (as we have said earlier in this article) that qualified
firms are tapping savings at the expense of other potential users. Judging
by the state of the capital market in recent years, however, it is doubtful that
special tax favors to private investment are needed to absorb either private
savings, or any governmental savings that might eventually derive from
budgetary surpluses.
to exercise a guiding influence on the propensity to consume .... Furthermore, it seems
unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be sufficient by
itself to determine an optimum rate of investment." Keynes went on to foresee "a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment" as the only road to approximate full employment. But he did not recommend state ownership; rather, the central government
would have to determine the rate of investment and the "basic rate of reward" to the
owners of capital. The relation of these remarks to recent developments in the fiscal area
will be obvious.
44. This is the basis of the Council of Economic Advisers' view that "The role of a
policy of monetary ease at full employment is then to insure that the resources freed by
a tight fiscal policy are indeed used for investment and not wasted in unemployment." Tis
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONoMic ADvisERs 131 (1962). Note particularly the
word "insure," which seems to imply absence of doubt about ability.
45. EcoNobic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 12 (1962); see BOARD OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SysTEM,ANNUAL REPORT 3 et seq. (1951).
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The conclusions of this article can be stated briefly. Despite more than
thirty years of experience with monetary and fiscal policy for stable growth
since the appearance of Keynes's General Theory, the vast complexity of a
modern industrial economy, coupled with the multiplicity of objectives and
the wide range of specific effects of supposedly aggregative instruments of
policy, have given rise to much disagreement among the experts with respect
to the effectiveness of control policy in the mixed public-private enterprise
economy. But the sense of discouragement often encountered in both lay and
professional literature does not appear to be fully justified. This is because
both economists and the general public quite rightly demand standards of
performance that are sometimes impossibly high. In itself this is a healthy
attitude; but the danger does exist that failure of an administration to measure up to these standards may involve serious costs in terms of political instability. A laboratory scientist can run through a course of experiments with
little more cost than time and materials. In the social framework, on the
other hand, there is the serious additional cost that performance of a needed
experiment may result in replacement of the experimenter with another technician. This fact necessarily constrains freedom of experiment, and almost
certainly militates against the use of the "fine tuning" advocated by optimists.
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